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Budgetary constraints, the resulting increase in the number of bid protests, and an insufficient 
acquisition workforce have seemingly conspired to propel the use of lowest price technically 
acceptable (LPTA) evaluation criteria by the Department of Defense (DoD). Under LPTA, the 
government agency awards the contract to the offeror submitting the lowest price proposal that 
meets the technical requirements.  
Its expanded use has been met with opposition from segments of the contractor community, 
particularly those that provide high-end, complex services for which a thorough examination of 
“trade-offs” between cost and non-cost factors is often more suitable. These contractors assert, 
and rightly so, that they are offering better value to the government—which may come at a 
higher price.  
The use of LPTA can be inappropriate at times, especially when the technology in question is 
complex or unprecedented, or when lives are at stake. However, LPTA has also been recently 
subjected to undue criticism. LPTA has been used successfully in the past, under the right 
circumstances—that is, when the requirement is clearly definable and when the risk of 
unsuccessful contract performance is minimal. For instance, LPTA is often used to acquire 
interchangeable commodities. In addition, LPTA is used when higher performance would add 
little value and is believed to be unnecessary, often resulting in little added value. 
LPTA and the trade-off source selection process are both used to leverage competition among 
firms and to select the best-value provider. The trade-off process provides agencies the capacity 
to choose a contractor by comparing the competing offerors’ different combinations of quality 
and price (Edwards, 2006). Under LPTA, however, trade-offs are explicitly impermissible. Once 
all proposals have been evaluated to ensure that they meet the identified technical requirements, 
the agency is required to choose the vendor solely on the basis of price competition.  
LPTA is defined by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR, 2013) as an appropriate approach 
when the acquisition requirements are “clearly definable,” and the “risk of unsuccessful contract 
performance is minimal.” There are four distinct benefits associated with LPTA, including the 
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potential for lower costs, its use of simpler and more objective evaluation criteria, the lower 
likelihood of a bid protest, and the clarity of decision justifications.  
However, there is a growing concern, often voiced by industry, that the pressures of price 
minimization will result in the reduction of quality delivered to government. Industry reports 
have emphasized that over-reliance on an LPTA approach can compromise success, especially 
for complex mission services. The National Defense Industrial Association (2012) named 
improper use of LPTA sourcing as one of its “top issues” of 2012, while the Professional 
Services Council (PSC)) called monitoring the frequency and misuse of LPTA a “2013 Policy 
Priority” (PSC & Grant Thornton, 2012).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, government acquisition executives have a different point of view; 
according to a recent PSC survey, the majority tend to believe that the technical requirements of 
most LPTA solicitations are set high enough to ensure that the best performers are all viable 
competitors (i.e., the poor performers cannot meet the threshold requirements; PSC & Grant 
Thornton, 2012). 
Some believe that the problem is overstated or that attention is being diverted from the 
underlying issues. It has been suggested that heightened competition is the greater concern (i.e., 
more contractors competing for fewer contracts) or that the real blame lies not with the LPTA 
mechanism itself, but with the government’s ability to follow procedures correctly. There is no 
doubt, however, that LPTA has been used to successfully acquire products and services, though 
these are typically commoditized, commercial, and/or non-complex goods and services; 
examples include dining services, janitorial services, and snow removal.  
However, given the current budgetary environment, and prevailing incentives, there is more 
concern than ever that the government is awarding contracts to the lowest bidder, even if that 
bidder is unable to deliver an acceptable product or service—let alone the best value. This is 
especially worrisome now that LPTA source selection has been expanded to the procurement of 
complex hardware and high-knowledge-content professional services.  
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Recently, LPTA was used to acquire the Air Force’s new refueling tanker, resulting in a more 
objective and simpler evaluation, at least compared to the prior competition (which was canceled 
after the GAO sustained a bid protest by one of the offerors). It is true that the use of LPTA is 
simpler. Indeed, many described the initial solicitation as unwieldy. But it remains to be seen 
whether or not reliance on LPTA will result in best value. 
There are reasons to believe that the best value was not achieved. For instance, the Air Force 
determined that the aircraft proposed by the losing party would perform more effectively during 
wartime. However, the winning party’s aggressive bid was low enough to overcome this 
advantage.  
In another example, the Navy sought to create a single, functionally secure, enterprise-wide 
network (NGen) in order to support connectivity between onshore activities and at-sea operations 
(Slabodkin, 2012). Despite the technical complexity and size of the project, LPTA was used for 
the source selection. The challenges associated with the project were widespread, from project 
delays, to customer dissatisfaction with the product, to questions about long-term performance. 
Recently, the Navy announced it would delay the previously scheduled contract award from 
February to May, due to the complexities of the NGen requirements, leading one to question the 
wisdom of using LPTA.  
The use of LPTA for contracts related to embassy security has also come under fire as of late. In 
2007, the U.S. Department of State awarded a private security contract, on an LPTA basis, to 
Armor Group North America (ANGA), to protect the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The 
five-year contract was valued at $189 million (Schulman, 2009). The runner-up, Wackenhut 
Corp of Arlington, VA, presented a bid that was $80 million more expensive. Over the next two 
years, the project was plagued with cost-overruns, mismanagement, and security failures 
(Weckstein & Delgado, 2012).  
Findings 
The DoD can anticipate declining budgets for the next several years. Accordingly, there is ever-
increasing pressure to find cost savings, with the potential that acquisition officials will continue 
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to rely on LPTA in order to save money. It is therefore imperative that officials learn to leverage 
LPTA effectively and only when it is appropriate. In the following list, we provide some guiding 
rationales that government acquisition officials should consider in deciding upon a source 
selection process. 
• LPTA can be overused. 
The overuse of LPTA by the government carries its own set of unique risks. If the trend 
toward greater reliance on LPTA continues, then there is a worry that industry will react by 
more closely adhering to the letter of each and every contract. As a result, government 
acquisition officials will have to spell out all requirements, including the smallest details—
details that may have gone unspecified in the past—in order to ensure that the needed 
requirements, as envisioned by the government, are fully met.  
• LPTA reduces the incentive to innovate. 
Increased reliance on LPTA may deprive the government of the innovative services and 
products to which agencies are accustomed and upon which their missions rely. Reducing the 
demand for new innovation could potentially weaken America’s economy and national 
security posture.  
• Aggressive cost cutting can impact quality and value. 
The expansion of LPTA to higher risk acquisitions not only creates controversy, but may 
deprive the government of quality and value, and, in the end, may cost more. In a number of 
instances, government contract administrators have been required to choose the lowest priced 
option over one that they believed would provide the best value to the government. 
• LPTA can lower investments in human capital.  
The constrained budgetary environment and the increased usage of LPTA may lead (and has 
already led some) incumbent firms to cut the salaries of their workforce in order to retain 
their vendor position against lower bids. Those costs can cut incumbent workforce salaries by 




The LPTA approach often reduces the cost of acquisitions, but the savings typically only provide 
short-term relief, which often comes at the expense of long-term risk mitigation, better quality, 
and greater innovation. Some changes could provide improved usage of LPTA, without stifling 
innovation and risking project completion. We provide the following recommendations. 
• Use LPTA only when “technically acceptable” can be fully defined and the risk is 
low. 
Consensus from industry leaders in the contracting space is that when the government 
asks for goods and services that are “technically acceptable,” it receives just that: a 
product that is minimally acceptable, but in no way superior. This is a result of a 
perception that delivery above “acceptable” must inherently mean more costly, or “gold 
plated,” but this is not necessarily true. Even when lower risk, higher performance, and 
greater reliability come at a higher cost, the added value is often worth it. 
• Incorporate past performance. 
Past performance should be used as an evaluation factor in the LPTA process, especially 
when acquiring complex mission support services. There is no reason that past 
performance cannot be assessed on a graduated scale. Government agencies could still 
award contracts to the lowest price, technically acceptable offeror, provided that the 
offeror earns a past performance confidence assessment rating of “substantial 
confidence.”  
• Reduce potentially inappropriate use of LPTA. 
The FAR states that LPTA usage is limited to incidents where service requirements are 
“clearly definable” and “the risk of unsuccessful contract performance” is not “minimal.” 
Complex and professional services are rarely “clearly definable” and the government 
deserves something better than minimally acceptable in what it delivers to the warfighters 
and the taxpayers. There is value in providing solutions above what is prescribed by 
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contracting officers, including industry-based innovation, improved accuracy in schedule 
and delivery, and most importantly, long-term cost reductions.  
• Improve government–vendor communications. 
Communication is a tool that benefits the government’s acquisition teams and program 
managers, and it should not be impaired by fear of protest. Perhaps this is understandable 
in light of recent high-profile cases (for example, the GAO upheld Boeing’s tanker 
protest, in part, because the Air Force engaged in “unequal discussions”; GAO, 2008). In 
order to reduce bid protests based on unequal communication, a greater effort must be 
made to improve communication between acquisition personnel and government 
contractors. Restricting communication out of fear of protest will, in all likelihood, lead 
to a greater number of “unequal discussions” and, worse still, misunderstandings of the 
government’s needs. 
• Invest in the government acquisition workforce. 
 
In order to effectively develop the required human capital for the modern acquisition 
environment, the DoD must enhance its recruitment processes, improve the hiring 
process, strive for quality not quantity, provide competitive wages, incentivize employees 
for improved performance, and provide continuing training and education. Only a highly 
trained workforce can determine if the LPTA is appropriate in the first place. Moreover, 
in instances when LPTA use has been criticized, it is sometimes unclear whether the 
LPTA mechanism itself is to blame, or if the problem lies with the government’s inability 
to adequately identify and articulate the required minimum requirements. In order to 
maximize the effectiveness of source selection processes, LPTA or otherwise, we must 
invest more in the acquisition workforce. 
 
The inappropriate use of lowest price technically acceptable source selection is on the rise, 
particularly in areas of professional services, complex services, and IT. However, consideration 
must be given to non-cost factors when appropriate, and awards should not be shoehorned into 
an LPTA source selection as a means of avoiding potential protest or expediting the award. 




Since 2009, the federal government has incurred annual deficits of over one trillion dollars. 
Efforts by the White House to reduce these deficits by increasing taxes have been met with 
resistance from Congress, which has sought to decrease the deficit through reduced spending. In 
2013, the failure to reach a budget compromise triggered automatic across-the-board spending 
cuts, known as the sequester. The consequences are far reaching. For instance, the Federal 
Aviation Administration had to resort to reducing the hours of its 47,000 employees, while the 
National Institutes of Health will issue approximately 700 fewer competitive research project 
grants.  
The Department of Defense (DoD) will be hit the hardest. Frank Kendall, under secretary of 
defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics (AT&L), estimated that the sequester would 
lead to a nearly 10% reduction at the program, project, and activity level, spanning roughly 2,500 
DoD undertakings (Miller, 2013). In May 2013, many of the DoD’s 700,000 civilian employees 
began two-day-a-week furloughs.  
It is against this backdrop that the DoD is working to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency 
of its investments (i.e., achieving “best value”) in order to continue to meet its operational 
requirements as well as modernize for the future. 
Because the DoD spends more on goods and services than any other federal department—
approximately $400 billion annually—its acquisition and procurement strategies are subject to 
both internal and external review and criticism. In response, the DoD has attempted numerous 
reforms. For example, in 2010, the Pentagon introduced its Better Buying Power (BBP) 
initiative, which provides guidance aimed at cutting acquisition costs by $100 billion over a five-
year period. Under BBP, the military services and defense agencies have reduced requirements 
creep, mandated affordability as a requirement, established higher standards for leadership 
positions, and increased the use of performance-based budgeting.  
Although BBP does not specifically advocate one set of contract evaluation criteria over another, 
the Services and Agencies have responded to the budgetary pressures by increasing their reliance 
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on lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) criteria in assessing offerors’ submissions. For 
any given solicitation, the decision to use the LPTA source selection process is identified in the 
request for proposals. The DoD is then bound to award the contract to the vendor that offers the 
lowest evaluated price—provided that the proposal meets established technical threshold 
requirements. The second iteration of Better Buying Power (BBP 2.0) was released in November 
2012. The new guidance suggests that when LPTA is used, “technically acceptable” must be 
better defined in order to ensure needed quality (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2013). 
The expanded use of LPTA criteria has been met with opposition from segments of the 
contractor community, particularly those that provide high-end, complex services for which a 
thorough examination of “trade-offs” between cost and non-cost factors is often more suitable. 
These contractors assert, and rightly so, that they are attempting to offer best value to the 
government—which may come at a higher price.  
For instance, under LPTA, there is no need to perform trade-off analysis or to compare the 
specific technical solutions provided by multiple vendors. As a result, when using LPTA as the 
source selection criteria, there is a greater risk that the selected vendor may not provide the best-
value service or product to the customer. Consequently, the adage “you get what you pay for” 
applies. Firms offering lower prices may have fewer, or less experienced, employees; unreliable 
supply chains; or less effective quality control processes—factors that may not be evident in the 
proposal, and, even if they are, such factors are typically excluded from consideration under 
LPTA. 
The current budgetary environment has also affected defense firms’ business decisions and 
strategies. Hoping to get a larger piece of the decreasing budgetary pie, firms have initiated more 
bid protests over the last decade, particularly in high-visibility, high-value acquisitions. In fact, 
there is a belief that the increasing number of bid protests has unduly pressured federal agencies 
to rely more heavily on LPTA—and its clear-cut criteria—so as to avoid drawn-out, and 
sometimes costly, bid protests. This belief appears to be valid. Although precise numbers are 
difficult to obtain, it is possible to draw some inferences. Figure 1 indicates that the total number 
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of bid protests filed by private industry is steadily increasing. Yet, the number of protests filed 
when LPTA was used for source selection has remained a tiny fraction of the total.  
 
Figure 1. Bid Protests, 2005–2012 
Note. The information for this figure came from GAO, n.d. 
 
The lack of an adequately trained acquisition workforce may have led to the recent increase in 
the use of LPTA. It has also been well documented that the DoD’s acquisition workforce has 
significant shortcomings in both total numbers and experience levels. Major reductions in the 
civilian acquisition workforce (a decrease of almost half over the last 20 years) and recent 
furloughs have reduced the DoD’s capacity to adequately conduct complex source selections. 
Moreover, aging personnel (in 2005, “Baby Boomers” and “Silent Generation” employees made 
up roughly 76% of the acquisition workforce) are retiring at an ever-increasing rate. And newer 
personnel often do not have the experience and judgment necessary to make the cost–
performance trade-offs. Frequently described as a “bathtub” situation, there is an acute shortage 
of acquisition personnel that have between five and 15 years of experience (Nackman, 2010). In 
fact, today, 55% of the DoD acquisition workforce have fewer than five years of experience.  
Budgetary constraints, the resulting increase in the number of bid protests, and an insufficient 
acquisition workforce have seemingly conspired to propel the use of LPTA evaluation criteria by 













technology in question is complex or unprecedented, or when lives are at stake—cases that we 
examine in Section III. However, LPTA has also been subjected to undue criticism. “Would you 
select your doctor based on lowest price?” is a common rejoinder among LPTA critics. Indeed, 
you just might if his/her qualifications are truly indistinguishable from others’ or if it is a matter 
of a simple, routine procedure. Indeed, LPTA has been used successfully in the past, under the 
right circumstances—that is, when the requirement is clearly definable, and the risk of 
unsuccessful contract performance is minimal.  
Report Roadmap 
As LPTA procurements are used more frequently, they are likely to create more controversy. 
There is concern that the use of LPTA source selection will increase to the point where mission 
effectiveness may be threatened. At the same time, some of the concern is unwarranted and can 
be attributed to an inaccurate understanding of the LPTA process. In this report, we describe 
these concerns and examine different cases in order to outline a desirable balance between the 
use of LPTA and other source selection processes. We begin with a brief background of source 
selection criteria and highlight some of the concerns regarding the increased use of LPTA. Next, 
we examine appropriate and questionable uses of LPTA. We then summarize our findings. In the 





The trade-off source selection process (wherein cost and performance can be “traded off) and the 
LPTA process are the two frequently employed processes designed to leverage competition 
among firms. In the following sections, we describe in more detail the trade-off and LPTA 
source selection processes. Then, we discuss some of the concerns regarding LPTA usage. 
Trade-Off Source Selection   
Authorized by FAR 15.101-1, the trade-off process provides agencies the capacity to choose a 
contractor by comparing the competing offerors’ different combinations of quality and price 
(Edwards, 2006). In different types of acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or price may 
vary. For example, where requirements are clearly defined, and risks generally appear minimal, 
cost may be the most important criteria in evaluating trade-offs. Conversely, if requirements are 
less defined and the scope of work is more complex with considerable risk involved, past 
performance and technical capability grow in importance as criteria for source selection. 
According to the FAR, this process permits trade-offs among cost or price and non-cost factors 
and allows the government to accept higher priced proposals. The FAR also states that the 
perceived benefits of the higher priced proposal must merit the additional cost, and the rationale 
for trade-offs must be documented in the file in accordance with FAR directives. 
Note that within the context of source selection, “trade-off” is often used synonymously with 
another term, “best value.” Such usage is erroneous, however, and implicitly suggests that in 
order to obtain the lowest price (the stated objective under LPTA), “value” must be sacrificed. In 
fact, according to FAR 15.101-2, LPTA may be used only “when best value is expected to result 
from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price.” 
Unfortunately, even in the recent BBP 2.0 guidance, the term “best value” is used in opposition 
to LPTA. 
LPTA Source Selection 
When using LPTA, trade-offs are explicitly impermissible. Once the proposals that meet or 
exceed the technical requirements have been identified, the source selection authority is required 
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to select the vendor solely on the basis of price competition. The source selection authority is not 
avoiding trade-offs entirely—instead, the trade-offs are meant to occur through market research 
and development of the program’s requirements, even before RFPs are released.  
 
LPTA is defined by the FAR as an appropriate approach when the acquisition requirements are 
“clearly definable,” and the “risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal.” There are 
several benefits associated with LPTA source selection. 
• LPTA can lower costs: The current fiscal and budgetary climate has prompted acquisition 
and procurement personnel to find ways to cut costs, which has resulted in the increased 
usage of LPTA. Potentially, LPTA source selection can reduce costs while providing the 
government with the best-value solution.  
 
• Simpler source selection: Contracting officers evaluate technical acceptability of 
proposals and award the contract to the lowest bidder without having to analyze cost–
performance trade-offs.  
 
• Less likely to prompt a legal fight: Awards made via LPTA are price-based decisions and 
generally are more difficult to challenge because there are less subjective source selection 
criteria. 
 
• Clarity of decision justifications: Trade-off judgments must be well-documented and 
explained during the debriefing process, after an award is made. If lowest cost is deemed 
the primary metric of evaluation during the cost/non-cost trade-off process, then 
justifying the decision is simple.  
Concerns Over LPTA Usage 
There is a growing concern, often voiced by industry, that the pressures of price minimization 
will result in the reduction of both quality and performance delivered to the government. The 
National Defense Industrial Association named improper use of LPTA sourcing as one of its “top 
issues” of 2012; while the Professional Services Council (PSC) called monitoring the frequency 
and misuse of LPTA a “2013 Policy Priority.” Stan Soloway, PSC president and CEO, noted, 
“There is a strong consensus that LPTA source selection strategies have essentially become the 
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default … approach, almost regardless of the nature of the requirements involved” (as cited in 
Weigelt, 2012a).  
In a recent PSC survey, respondents acknowledged that the selection decision criteria should 
better reflect the nature of the solicitation. According to one respondent, “LPTA is okay for 
commoditized services like janitorial services and ground maintenance. But with complex 
services like IT, they have to be more performance-based or at least best value [i.e., based on a 
trade-off analysis]” (PSC and Grant Thornton LLP, 2012).  
Another private defense contractor, TASC Inc., released a report warning of the risks of lowest 
price acquisition approaches, including posing unnecessary contractual risks, budget overruns, 
delivery delays, and, in the worst cases, mission failure (TASC, 2012). The report emphasized 
that over-reliance on an LPTA approach can compromise success, especially for complex 
mission services, and, therefore, recommended avoidance of the LPTA source selection method 
for such contracts, as well as for other professional services.  
During a recent interview, the CEO of a midsize firm that provides systems engineering and 
technical assistance (SETA) services to government customers asserted that competition under 
LPTA is driving his company’s profit margins into single digits (often below 5%). As a result, 
his firm has begun to ignore LPTA solicitations. Indeed, LPTA solicitations have a tendency to 
attract SETA and other service providers whose employees have less experience. Though these 
firms may have the minimum requisite technical expertise, at least on paper, their personnel may 
be of a lower technical caliber. The CEO of the firm in question made the following observation: 
“When I see hourly rates for experienced engineers and program managers with advanced 
degrees … that are less than what car mechanics earn at Jiffy Lube, then you have to say that 
something isn’t right. We are in the wrong business for this period of time.” 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, government acquisition executives have a different point of view. In the 
2012 PSC survey referenced previously, acquisition executives were asked to read two 
statements regarding LPTA and then to select the one that is closer to their view. The two 
statements read as follows: 
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1. “Company bids do not get adequate credit for innovation, performance, history, or 
investments in people, technology, and overall excellence.”  
2. “The technical requirements of most solicitations are set high enough to ensure that the 
best performers are all viable competitors.” 
An overwhelming 78% held that the second statement was closer to their personal view. Clearly, 
there is a disconnect between industry and government regarding the appropriateness of LPTA 
solicitations.  
Some executives believe that the problem is overstated or that attention is being diverted from 
the underlying issues. Ray Bjorklund (2013), vice president and chief knowledge officer at 
Herndon-based Deltek Inc., stated that, based on his analysis, while the use of LPTA is rising, it 
was appropriately used in most of the cases he examined (i.e., the requirements were clearly 
defined, and the risk of unsuccessful performance was minimal). But even by his count, between 
2011 and 2012 uses of LPTA in situations Bjorklund considered “questionable” doubled (albeit 
from 63 instances to 126). However, this increase still represents a small percentage of all LPTA 
solicitations during this time period (in numbers, not necessarily dollar value). According to 
Bjorklund (2013), heightened competition is the greater concern, at least from industry’s point of 
view. In his view, the real problem is that “the same number of contractors [are] competing for 
fewer dollars.” LPTA contracting, it might be assumed, has been unfairly cast as the scapegoat.  
Daniel Gordon, former Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy in the Office of 
Management and Budget (OFPP), and current associate dean for government procurement law 
studies at George Washington University Law School, believes the real problem is whether the 
agency generating and soliciting the contract “followed the evaluation scheme, fairly and 
reasonably evaluated the competing proposals, and documented its decisions” (Nash & 
Schooner, 2012). In other words, he believes the real blame lies not with the LPTA mechanism 
itself, but with the government’s ability to follow procedures correctly. Similarly, there is reason 
to believe that if government could better identify and articulate its minimum needs, then LPTA 
would prove more suitable.   
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III. LPTA in Practice 
LPTA should only be used when the best value is expected to result from selection of the 
technically acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated price (FAR 15.101-2). The LPTA 
process, then, is most appropriate for the acquisition of services or supplies, the requirements for 
which are clearly defined and can be achieved at minimal risk. Indeed, LPTA is often used to 
successfully acquire commoditized, commercial, and/or non-complex goods and services; 
examples include dining services, janitorial services, and snow removal. 
Fuel supply and management is one area where the use of LPTA contracts is on the rise. 
According to a 2010 GAO report, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) officials have moved from 
trade-off source selection to LPTA for most fuel purchases in low-risk markets. Exceptions 
include areas where the DLA has minimal knowledge about vendors’ past performance or that 
require technical capabilities in high-risk situations, such as war zones or regions of natural 
disasters. The DLA has increased the use of LPTA in other areas, too. Between September 2009 
and May 2013, the DLA awarded an unprecedented nine LPTA contracts, totaling almost $5.6 
billion, including awards for forklifts for the Navy ($22.5 million), industrial hygiene services 
for a health clinic ($4.8 billion), and warehousing and logistics services for a defense distribution 
center ($2.2 million)—all of which seem to be in keeping with the intended usage of LPTA.  
But given the current budgetary environment, and prevailing incentives, there is more concern 
than ever that the government is awarding contracts to the lowest bidder, even if that bidder is 
unable to deliver an acceptable product or service—let alone the best value. This is especially 
worrisome now that LPTA source selection has been expanded to the procurement of complex 
hardware and high-knowledge-content professional services. This concern is not altogether new; 
famed NASA astronaut Alan Shepard was once asked by reporters what he thought about as he 
sat atop the Redstone rocket, waiting for liftoff. Shepard replied, “The fact that every part of this 
ship was built by the low bidder” (Kranz, 2009). In the next section, we examine instances in 




U.S. Air Force’s KC-X Program 
The Air Force’s fleet of refueling tankers is critical to the effectiveness of the U.S military. The 
current Air Force fleet of 531 tankers (KC-135s), now average well over 40 years in age. The 
other tanker aircraft, the KC-10A, although newer, have been in service about 20 years on 
average. The expense and time required to maintain aging tankers have increased significantly in 
recent years. Maintenance per aircraft is growing at an annual compound growth rate of 6.1% for 
the KC-135E, 6.6% for the KC-135R, and 13.4% for the KC-135T (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2006).  
The acquisition of new tankers to replace the ageing fleet has proved challenging, to say the 
least. In 2001, Congress authorized the Air Force to lease 100 new KC-767 tankers from Boeing 
for six years, starting in 2006 (GAO, 2003). However, this agreement was cancelled amidst 
allegations of improper dealings between Boeing and Air Force officials, and led to the 
conviction of the former principal deputy under secretary of the Air Force for acquisition 
(Branstetter, 2005). 
The Air Force then decided that it would purchase the aircraft outright. The RFP, released in 
2007, informed offerors that factors including mission capability, proposal risk, and past 
performance factors were more important than cost/price—though price was still a factor—and 
that these would be assessed on a trade-off basis. A measure of wartime effectiveness, the 
Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA), also figured into the evaluations. Figure 






Figure 2. Evaluation Factors (GAO, 2008) 
 
 
With regard to the first of these factors, mission capability, the contractor was assigned a color 
rating (e.g., blue for outstanding, green for acceptable, red for unacceptable) in each of five 
related areas: key system requirements, system integration, product support, program 
management, and technology maturity (see Figure 2; GAO, 2008).  
In addition to these factors, the RFP identified several key system attributes (KSAs) related to 
aerial refueling, airlift, survivability, and operational utility, among others (GAO, 2008). There 
were also numerous non-KPP/KSA factors that were desired but not required. These factors were 
considered part of the offerors’ design trade space, where modifications could be made by 
contractors to achieve the maximum balance between cost, performance, and schedule. Offerors 
were encouraged to satisfy as many of these tradespace requirements as possible. 
However, with regard to the nine key performance parameters (KPPs; see Figure 3), the 
solicitation explicitly stated that “no consideration [would be] provided for exceeding KPP 




Figure 3. Key Performance Parameters (GAO, 2008) 
Two firms, Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS (NGE), submitted proposals, with each based 
on existing aircraft (NGE’s was based on an Airbus from EADS). The two proposals received 
nearly identical evaluation ratings. Each received the same five color ratings for mission 
capability factors and the same grade for past performance. The evaluated costs were also very 
similar. Boeing’s proposal came in at $108.044 billion and NGE’s at $108.010 billion (GAO, 
2008). 
After lengthy discussions with both firms and a protracted evaluation period, the Air Force 
awarded the contract to NGE. Its decision was purportedly based on NGE’s strengths in the areas 
of mission capability, past performance (for which equal color scores were given to both firms), 
and cost/price (which included cost risk, for which Boeing received a slightly worse score).  
Given the value of the contract, the costly proposal preparation, and near-identical evaluation 
scores, the award was bound to incite fierce reaction. Boeing submitted a bid protest shortly after 
the contract was awarded, asserting that the Air Force failed to evaluate the proposals in 
accordance with the stated criteria. Boeing contended that the Air Force failed to properly take 
into account the tradespace requirements. Indeed, the Air Force had identified five 
“discriminators” (i.e., features evaluated as strengths) in the area of aerial refueling in Boeing’s 
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proposal, but only one in NGE’s. Yet, NGE received a higher overall score in this area. In an 
initial response to Boeing, the Air Force asserted that the Boeing proposal contained “more 
discriminators offering less benefit” (GAO, 2008, p. 32). Though Boeing acknowledged that 
source selections should not be based upon a simple count of strengths and weaknesses, 
executives asserted that the solicitation specifically stated that offerors make an effort to meet as 
many tradespace requirements as possible, an effort for which Boeing received no credit. The 
GAO agreed with Boeing, stating that the Air Force gave “no consideration to Boeing’s offer to 
satisfy significantly more trade space requirements” (p. 32).  
In addition, despite earning the same color scores under the mission capability requirement, NGE 
received a significantly higher numerical score in the area of refueling under the key system 
requirements subfactor—the most critical subfactor under mission capability (see Figure 2). 
Though this raises questions regarding the utility of the color scoring scheme, Boeing had greater 
reason to be dissatisfied. Boeing asserted that the credit awarded to NGE reflected the fact that 
NGE’s proposed tanker significantly exceeded the second KPP related to fuel offload versus 
unrefueled range (GAO, 2008). And although mission capability requirements were to be 
evaluated on a trade-off basis, KPPs were only to be evaluated on a pass/fail basis.  
The Air Force and NGE attempted to convince the GAO that this KPP was “unbounded,” that 
there was no specified minimum threshold, and that NGE’s proposal rightfully earned a higher 
score (GAO, 2008). Despite these assertions, the GAO sided with Boeing, issuing its decision to 
sustain the protest in 2008. 
In 2009 the Air Force devised a new source selection process that relied primarily on LPTA 
evaluation criteria, an unexpected choice, perhaps, given that Boeing’s protest was sustained 
largely on account of the Air Force’s understandable desire to fully evaluate KPPs. Nevertheless, 
LPTA was chosen in an effort to clarify and simplify the solicitation process and ensure against 
future protests. Given LPTA’s reputation, it is perhaps unsurprising that Deputy Secretary of 
Defense William Lynn flatly asserted that the new process “is not a Low Price Technically 
Acceptable (LPTA) Approach…In acquisition parlance, this is a best value competition, with 
price and non-price factors taken into account” (Lynn et al., 2009, p. 3). 
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Indeed, some elements of the tankers would be evaluated on a trade-off basis. The offeror’s price 
would be adjusted downward to reflect life-cycle cost over 40 years, and all proposals would be 
evaluated using the Integrated Fleet Aerial Refueling Assessment (IFARA). To an extent, then, 
higher cost could be traded for more efficient design.  
However, the non-price (i.e., non-mandatory) factors (there were only 93) to which Secretary 
Lynn made reference would only to be considered in the event that the leading offerors’ cost 
proposals came within 1% of each other; otherwise, the lowest cost offeror would be awarded the 
contract, provided that it met or exceeded the 373 mandatory requirements. Boeing and EADS 
submitted final bids which were far apart; thus, the non-price factors played no role in the 
outcome. In the end, Boeing’s initial protest paid off. It was awarded the contract in February of 
2011. It should be noted that Northrop Grumman, which had teamed with EADS in an effort to 
win the initial competition, decided not to bid the second time around. The CEO of Northrop 
Grumman, Wes Bush, issued the following statement:  
We reached this conclusion [i.e., not to submit a bid] based on the structure of the source 
selection methodology defined in the RFP, which clearly favors Boeing’s smaller 
refueling tanker and does not provide adequate value recognition of the added capability 
of a larger tanker, precluding us from any competitive opportunity. (Northrop Grumman, 
2010, p. 1)  
Boeing would later contend that the EADS proposal, which was also based on a larger aircraft, 
was unfairly accommodated by the Air Force, contrary to RFP requirements.  
As previously discussed, LPTA criteria can only be applied when the soliciting agency reasons 
that its use will result in the best value. However, it remains to be seen whether or not reliance on 
LPTA will result in best value in this case. It is true that the use of LPTA resulted in a more 
objective and simpler evaluation. Indeed, many described the initial solicitation as unwieldy. 
Stockman, Ross, Bongiovi, and Sparks (2011) write that the initial competition relied on “the 
theoretical belief that … [the Air Force] can consider hundreds of important performance, 
maintenance, operational, and cost factors which can then be rank ordered, weighted, and then 
recombined into a single objective evaluation score to find the best choice” (p. 104). And 
Kaymaz and Diri (2008) uncovered flaws in the use of the color-coding scheme upon which the 
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initial competition relied. They concluded that the color rating method is not capable of 
reflecting small differences and information technology tools can help decision-makers choose 
the best-value offeror with less subjectivity, and that “if the [Air Force] had used the weighted 
sum method as its evaluation method, the winner of the KC-X program could have been 
different.” It is also important to remember that the cancellation of the initial competition further 
delayed Air Force acquisition efforts that had begun years earlier, thus adding to the overall 
expense of the program.  
 
At the same time, there are reasons to believe that the best value was not achieved. The Air Force 
determined that EADS’ aircraft would perform more effectively during wartime (EADS earned a 
significantly better IFARA score, which is based on how much fuel the plane delivers, how far it 
flies, and how long it can stay on station; Gates, 2010). But Boeing’s aggressive bid was low 
enough to overcome this advantage. Of course, spending less on the tankers may allow the Air 
Force to spend more on other programs; additionally, depending on how often the mission 
scenarios on which the IFARA scores are based actually occur, there may be little difference 
between the two tankers with regard to operational capability. 
To some degree, the Air Force’s use of LPTA informed the decision by both firms to base the 
design of their tankers on existing aircraft in their respective fleets. The two proposed aircraft 
were quite different; EADS’ was significantly larger than Boeing’s. In fact, Boeing maintained 
that the Air Force went out of its way to accommodate EADS’ larger design in order to foster 
competition, asserting that the Air Force underestimated the projected cost of jet fuel in the 
future, thereby lowering the life-cycle fuel costs of EADS’ aircraft (Gates, 2010). In addition, the 
Air Force chose 10 airfields for the military infrastructure analysis that Boeing thought to be 
unrepresentative of typical space constraints, which lowered EADS’ projected construction costs 
(Gates, 2010). Had the Air Force relied on a trade-off source selection process that specified 
requirements to a greater degree, then it may have gotten a better aircraft, one that combined the 






U.S. Navy Next Generation Enterprise Network  
In 2009, the Navy began planning one of the most comprehensive transition processes to new IT 
and cybersecurity services ever performed, in either the public or private sectors, with its Next 
Generation Enterprise Network (NGen). Plans began with the Navy seeking to replace its 
previous network infrastructure and operations contract (Navy/Marine Corps Intranet [NMCI]), 
which it had awarded to Electronic Data Systems (EDS; a company later acquired by Hewlett 
Packard Enterprise Services) in 2000.  
NMCI sought to create a single, functionally secure, enterprise-wide network in order to support 
connectivity between onshore activities and at-sea operations (Slabodkin, 2012). The plan 
includes connecting 360,000 computers to one secure intranet—the scope of this initiative is 
second only to the Internet itself. The challenges associated with the project were widespread; 
from project delays, to customer dissatisfaction with the product, to questions about long-term 
performance, NMCI was rife with complications (Jordan, 2007). One reason the project incurred 
such challenges came as a result of poorly defined technical requirements; neither EDS nor the 
Navy truly understood the scope of the challenge, and the technical needs were expected to be 
sorted out after the contract awarding. Further, both NMCI and EDS underestimated the 
challenge of transitioning from the legacy enterprise systems in place, and the number of systems 
they would actually need to address.  
It was estimated that the set of five Next Generation Enterprise Networks would be operational 
by March 2014. Notably, the Navy projects NGen will cost about $50 billion through 2025 and 
support over 800,000 users (Perera, 2011a). Despite the technical complexity and size of the 
project, LPTA evaluation criteria were used for the source selection. 
The Navy’s decision to award the NGen project on an LPTA basis is unprecedented. Never 
before has the Navy used an LPTA evaluation for a contract as large and technically complex as 
NGen. Still, NGen Program Director Capt. Shawn Hendricks argued, “It is made of the same 
stuff that makes up the networks that support USAA, and Proctor & Gamble and the Federal 
Bank and the Army and the Air Force, and there are companies out there that do it for a living, 
more than one” (as cited in Perera, 2011b). In Hendricks’s opinion, once the technical 
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requirements were met, there was difficulty in proving additional distinguishing characteristics. 
In a set of post-congressional hearing questions for the record from November 2011, Dan 
Gordon, the former OFPP administrator, stated under non-specific terms that while the LPTA is 
not always an appropriate acquisition strategy, if government does not expect to gain additional 
value from a proposal that exceeds minimum technical requirements, then LPTA may be a good 
fit (On the Front Lines, 2011). 
Conversely, it was noted in an editorial published in the Federal Times that because the NGen 
project is, in fact, a highly sophisticated and complex IT procurement, LPTA sourcing is a 
“failure waiting to happen” (Gansler, 2011). The GAO effectively made the same point in a 2010 
report, stating that the Defense Department should only use LPTA for simple purchases, such as 
fuel for the Air Force, but not technical or sensitive projects (GAO, 2010). Recently, the Navy 
announced it would delay the previously scheduled contract award from February to May, due to 
the complexities of the NGen requirements, leading one to question the wisdom of using LPTA 
as a source selection criterion.  
Personal Security Contract, U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan 
In 2007, the U.S. Department of State awarded a private security contract, on an LPTA basis, to 
Armor Group North America (ANGA), to protect the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. The 
contract was valued at $189 million (Schulman, 2009). The runner-up, Wackenhut Corp of 
Arlington, VA, presented a bid that was $80 million more expensive. Over the next two years, 
the project was plagued with cost-overruns, mismanagement, and security failures (Weckstein & 
Delgado, 2012).  
Since 1990, the Department of State has operated under 22 U.S.C 4864: Increased participation 
of United States contractors in local guard contracts abroad under diplomatic security program. 
The Code reads as follows. 
Many United States security firms that provide local guard services abroad have 
been unaware that local guard contracts were available for bidding abroad and 
such firms have been disadvantaged as a result. … It is the objective of this 
section to improve the efficiency of the local guard programs abroad administered 
by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the Department of State and to ensure 
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maximum competition for local guard contracts abroad concerning Foreign 
Service buildings. (22 U.S.C. § 4864) 
The Code also states that all local guard contracts for a Foreign Service building, in excess of 
$250,000, must be awarded on an LPTA basis. The Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC; 
2009), an independent and bipartisan legislative commission, warned of two potential 
consequences of required LPTA sourcing. These included (1) the potential for systemic under-
bidding and (2) high-quality contractors opting not to bid as a result of anticipation of such 
under-bidding.! 
Ultimately, these fears were substantiated, as complaints poured in over a two-year period, 
varying from reports of insufficient staffing numbers and inadequate training, to sexual 
misconduct and degradation of subordinates. In fact, in one letter from the State Department to 
ANGA, conditions were described as undermining the “performance of the contract to such a 
degree that the security of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is in jeopardy” (CWC, 2009). In its report, 
the CWC found mandated LPTA source selection to be inappropriate for security in war-zone 
embassies and urged flexibility in contract choice by way of a congressional amendment to 22 
U.S.C 4864, allowing the State Department to employ full-spectrum best-value contracting. !
In response to the report, Congress temporarily lifted the LPTA mandate for security contracts in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, though this action is set to expire in March 2013 (U.S. Senate, 
2013). !
Private Security at U.S. Diplomatic Posts 
Congress is currently considering changes to 22 U.S.C 4864, the 1990 public law mandating that 
the State Department accept the lowest bid when reviewing offers for private security services at 
U.S. diplomatic posts. The review came in part as a result of the September 2012 attack on the 
U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya, which killed Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other 
Americans. While Marines protect the entryways to U.S. embassies, the Benghazi facility was 
temporary and, thus, relied on the abilities of the locally hired and contracted guards. Documents 
recovered from the grounds of the American mission show that the guards hired by the State 
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Department received an hourly rate of 5.21 Libyan dinars—the equivalent of $4 per hour 
(Shachtman, 2012).!
Recently, Congress passed a spending bill that would extend the State Department’s temporary 
ability to hire local guards on a trade-off basis for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and “other hostile high-
risk areas” (Cornwell, 2013). Senators Robert Menendez and Bob Corker of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, though, are currently discussing the potential of making such changes 
permanent, according to aides. Further, in one of her final appearances before Congress, 
outgoing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed her interest in seeing the law changed 
permanently as well (U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2013).!
Still, building consensus in order to change the current policy will be challenging. The State 
Department inspector general’s office believes changing the law to allow best-value trade-off 
discretion could ultimately cost more (Cornwell, 2013). During the past several years, roughly 
$500 million has been spent annually on 30,000 local guards protecting roughly 285 U.S. 






The DoD can anticipate declining budgets for the next several years. Accordingly, there will be 
ever-increasing pressure to find cost savings, with the potential that acquisition officials will 
continue to rely on LPTA in order to save money. It is, therefore, imperative that officials learn 
to leverage LPTA effectively and only when it is appropriate. In the next sections, we provide 
some guiding rationales that government acquisition officials should consider in deciding upon a 
source selection process. 
LPTA Can Be Overused 
For years, industry leaders have proclaimed that the use of LPTA source selection has 
accelerated from judiciously prudent to recklessly frequent. As of late, the DoD and other 
government leaders have also begun to acknowledge the long-term challenges associated with 
inappropriate or questionable use of LPTA. For instance, HASC Chairman Howard Philip 
(“Buck”) McKeon (R-Calif.) criticized the DoD’s use of LPTA and warned that “[t]he 
committee believes that awarding contracts based on an LPTA basis should not become [the 
DoD’s] default position” (Covington & Burling LLP, 2013). HASC recently released its FY 
2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The document directs the GAO to 
investigate the use of LPTA and other source selection options and to report its findings to 
congressional defense committees by June 2014.  
The overuse of LPTA by the government carries its own set of unique risks, separate from those 
already discussed. If the trend toward greater reliance on LPTA continues, then there is a worry 
that industry will react by more closely adhering to the letter of each and every contract. As a 
result, government acquisition officials will have to spell out all requirements, including the 
smallest details—details that may have gone unspecified in the past—in order to ensure that the 
requirements, as envisioned by the government, are fully met.  
It has already been suggested that shortages and low experience levels within the acquisition 
workforce have led, in part, to the greater use of LPTA. However, drafting LPTA solicitations 
may become increasingly complex as dissatisfied firms seek to win contracts by bidding low and 
providing the absolute minimum that is required, perhaps through a selective interpretation of the 
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contract requirements, leading to additional challenges for an already-inadequate workforce. 
That the word “technically” has two different meanings is rather inauspicious in this regard. 
Within the context of LPTA, technically means “with regard to technical quality.” However, it 
can also mean “according to the exact meaning of something.” The overuse of LPTA may lead to 
its greater association with the second definition, which would be unfortunate for the 
government, and for contractors, too, who have historically provided their government customers 
with their best efforts. 
LPTA Reduces the Incentive to Innovate 
Increased reliance on LPTA may deprive the government of the innovative services and products 
to which agencies are accustomed and upon which their missions rely. Lisa Mascolo, CEO of 
Optimos Inc., wrote, “When I hear ‘acceptable,’ I think adequate, good enough, not great but 
okay” (Mascolo, 2012). Mascolo also believes that the pursuit of lower costs means the decline 
of innovation. She opines that “acceptable really is the antithesis of innovative.” She goes on to 
say, “LPTA is a hold-the-nose response to the economic climate. It doesn’t challenge 
government, or the service provider community, to do anything other than define, expect, and 
deliver adequate work—and we need and deserve a lot more than adequate” (Mascolo, 2012).  
Contrary to Mascolo’s assertion, however, some proponents of LPTA use contend that the 
pressure on vendors to reduce costs will force companies to invest in technology in order to 
improve efficiency, while reducing labor costs. This may be true to an extent, especially with 
regard to low-end products and services for which LPTA source selection is already being used. 
However, the DoD is increasingly buying more services than products (in FY 2009 service 
contracts accounted for 57% of the DoD acquisition budget; Defense Science Board, 2011). As a 
result, replacing people with technology to cut costs is unlikely, particularly for professional 
services. The Percell Group notes, “The presumption that low cost evaluations will encourage 
investment in technology to cut labor or other capital costs by providers may work in services 
like lawn mowing, but the reverse is true in complex services” (The Percell Group, 2013). 
Increased reliance on LPTA may also accelerate worrisome national trends. It is clear that global 
markets; technology proliferation; and education in science, technology, engineering and 
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mathematics will drive innovation in defense and other increasingly global industries. However, 
U.S. demographic reality (every day in America, 10,000 people age into social security) and the 
fact that many U.S. students have been choosing not to go into science and technology (by 2015, 
Brazil, China, and India will account for 88% of worldwide graduates in science, technology, 
engineering, and math programs (Maybury, 2013) all but guarantee that American dominance in 
scientific and technological innovation will continue to decline. In fact, recent estimates by 
Coffey and Ramberg (2012) suggest that the U.S. share of science and technology productivity 
will continue to decrease from 26% in 2005 to 18% in 2050. Reducing the demand for new 
innovation could potentially weaken America’s economy and national security posture.  
Aggressive Cost-Cutting Can Impact Quality and Value 
Using LPTA as a source selection strategy, can enable the DoD to cut the cost of low-risk 
acquisitions. However, the expansion of LPTA to higher risk acquisitions not only creates 
controversy, but also may deprive the government of quality and value, and, in the end, may cost 
more.  
A recent opinion article by Bob Lohfeld (2013), chief executive officer of the Lohfeld 
Consulting Group, details an LPTA procurement in which “rational decision-making” broke 
down. The DoD sought to purchase network equipment for military bases across the country. 
Because it was considered a relatively simple, low-risk acquisition, LPTA was used. All of the 
network equipment would be provided by the customer (i.e., the material costs for each vendor 
would be the same). Moreover, the installation fell under the purview of the Service Contract 
Act, where hourly wage minimums are specified by the Department of Labor, meaning that labor 
costs were also the same across vendors. Consequently, the range of prices offered by different 
vendors was very narrow. Lohfeld (2013) claims that once they viewed the proposals, the DoD’s 
technical evaluators preferred to make the decision on the merits of non-cost factors in order to 
better differentiate across options. However, the technical evaluators were restricted from using 
their judgment because LPTA source selections rely on a pass/fail decision. As a result, the 
evaluators were required to choose the lowest priced option over one they believed to be a 
superior proposal that would provide the best value to the government.  
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LPTA Can Lower Industries’ Investments in Human Capital  
Issues related to retention, development, and employee morale affect both the vendor and 
government. One of the great challenges for incumbent contractors is winning contracts for 
follow-on work. Under the first BBP initiative, service contracts were re-competed every three 
years in order to ensure competition, much to the dismay of service providers who regularly met 
or exceeded government expectations. In April 2013, the under secretary of defense AT&L 
modified this guidance to provide for the indirect competitive effect of using options for 
additional years of work as an alternative means of creating competitive incentives to better 
performance. It appears, then, that the government wishes to place greater importance on the 
incumbent’s past performance as a metric in the evaluation process. Yet, past performance is 
typically ignored under LPTA.  
 
In fact, the constrained budgetary environment and the increased usage of LPTA may lead 
incumbent companies to cut salaries of their workforce in order to retain their vendor position 
against lower bids. Those costs can cut incumbent workforce salaries by 15–20% or result in 
staff layoffs. In an effort to unseat incumbents, some newer, less experienced, Washington-area 
vendors offer salaries in the mid-$30,000s for positions that typically require post-graduate 
degrees (Simone, 2012). This can result in a “race to the bottom.” 
 
The budgetary restraints also affect government, with particular attention brought to the 
acquisition and procurement workforce. In FY 2010, there were $536.7 billion in government 
contracts awarded to over 303,000 contractors. While the amount of spending has decreased by 
almost $20 billion since that time, federal acquisition personnel are overworked and 
understaffed. In submitted testimony to Congress, Allan Burman (Doing Business, 2012), 
President of Jefferson Solutions, which provides acquisition support and management services, 
details the reality of challenges that face such personnel:  
We find overworked and understaffed acquisition personnel. Staff are coming in 
on the weekends in an effort to keep up with crippling workloads; new employees 
are forced to hit the ground running with little to no training or mentorship; 
existing staff do not have the time to take away from their work to get the 
training, development, and refreshers they need to perform effectively; and office 
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morale is low, causing high turnover as staff look for less stressful work at other 
agencies. (Doing Business With DoD, 2012) 
This lack of support manifests itself in the form of missing documentation, increasing backlogs, 
and an increased use of less complicated evaluation schemes, such as LPTA, in order to 
circumvent the time and effort it takes to appropriately apply more appropriate evaluation 




V. Recommendations and Conclusion 
The LPTA approach often reduces the costs of acquisitions, but the savings typically only 
provide short-term relief, which often comes at the expense of long-term risk mitigation, better 
quality, and greater innovation. LPTA can serve a useful purpose in selected federal acquisition 
and procurement realms (e.g., commodities). However, the fact that its usage appears be on the 
rise is cause for concern. 
Recommendations 
Some changes could provide improved usage of LPTA, without stifling innovation and risking 
project completion. We provide the following recommendations. 
Use LPTA only when “technically acceptable” can be fully defined and the risk is low. 
Consensus from industry leaders in the contracting space believe that when government asks for 
goods and services that are “technically acceptable,” they receive just that: a product that is 
acceptable, but in no way superior. This is a result of a perception that delivery above 
“acceptable” must inherently mean more costly, but this is not necessarily true..  
One method to achieve higher standards is to build them into the official solicitations; building 
improved metrics into the solicitations and necessitating proof of understanding through a 
statement of work (SOW) would provide the government with greater assurance, reduce risk, and 
hopefully eliminate project creep. This also helps eliminate “low-ball” offerors who may respond 
to an RFP by simply reiterating much of the same project description or requirements, without 
full conceptual understanding.  
Incorporate past performance.  
Past performance should be used as an evaluation factor in the LPTA process, especially when 
acquiring complex mission support services. However, as with LPTA requirements generally, 
competitors are typically rated as either “acceptable” or “unacceptable.” But there is no reason 
that past performance cannot be assessed on a graduated scale. Whether or not such a change 
violates the principles of LPTA is not particularly relevant. Government agencies could still 
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award contracts to the lowest price, technically acceptable offeror, provided that the offeror earns 
a past performance confidence assessment rating of “substantial confidence.” There is no reason 
to believe that this would lead to increased bid protests, lengthy solicitation periods, or other 
negative consequences associated with the use of trade-off source selection. 
In drafting the past performance requirements for high-end services solicitations, the government 
should ensure that prior contract performance is similar in size, scope, and, especially, 
complexity.  
Reduce potentially inappropriate use of LPTA. 
DoD acquisition and procurement officials are increasingly employing LPTA source selection 
strategies instead of trade-offs or other selection procedures that are a better fit for complex 
procurements. Federal acquisitions and procurement officials more frequently are employing 
LPTA to more quickly shepherd contracts, make awards, and begin deploying needed goods and 
services. Part of the concern of increased LPTA usage stems from buyers’ reduced effort in 
thoroughly evaluating the technical requirements. Some concern is related to insufficient 
personnel to evaluate appropriately, efficiently, or in a timely manner. While federal acquisition 
personnel numbers are up, a survey of federal government acquisition leaders shows that they 
fear that the combination of new, inexperienced personnel and the retirement of a significant 
proportion of the workforce in coming years may result in a drain on institutional knowledge 
unless appropriate education or training is implemented.  
The expansion of the LPTA source selection method to less conventional procurements is 
another challenge. The FAR states that LPTA usage is limited to incidents where service 
requirements are “clearly definable,” and “the risk of unsuccessful contract performance” is 
something other than “minimal.” Complex and professional services are rarely “clearly 
definable,” and the government deserves something better than acceptable in what it delivers to 
taxpayers. There is value in providing solutions that exceed the minimal requirements that are  
prescribed by contracting officers. This value comes in the form of  industry-based innovation, 
improved accuracy in schedule planning, and  most important, long-term cost reductions. Very 
rarely are the  goals of professional services contracts clearly definable; rather, requirements 
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evolve over time. Accordingly, there is always some degree of risk. This is especially true in the 
case of national security and intelligence services.  
Improve government–vendor communications. 
Under FAR 15.101-2, “exchanges” may occur between the buyer and the solicitor. Such 
exchanges can be classified as “clarifications” or “discussions.”. FAR 15.306 states, 
“Clarifications are limited exchanges between the government and offerors that may occur when 
award without discussions is contemplated.” Conversely, discussions give solicitors the 
opportunity to address those areas of their initial proposals that do not meet the minimum 
requirements needed to achieve an acceptable rating. If the agency opens discussions with one 
offeror, it must engage in discussions with all applying offerors in the competitive range.  
Yet government personnel rarely seek to engage in discussions, even during the contract’s 
requirements development phase, fearing a bid protest. Perhaps this is understandable in light of 
recent high-profile cases. For example, the GAO (2008) upheld Boeing’s tanker protest, in part, 
because the Air Force engaged in “unequal discussions.” The Air Force failed to inform Boeing 
that it had only partially fulfilled a KPP objective related to operational utility. However, the Air 
Force conducted discussions with NGE regarding its successful fulfillment of the same 
requirement (GAO, 2008). It is important to realize that bid protests are relatively rare in 
government contracting: in FY 2012, contractors filed 2,475 bid protest cases with the GAO and 
only 570 garnered a sustain-or-deny ruling. Of those, the GAO sustained only 106 cases. 
Nevertheless, a greater effort must be made to improve communication between acquisition 
personnel and government contractors. Restricting communication out of fear of protest will, in 
all likelihood, lead to a greater number of “unequal discussions.” 
To facilitate better communication, the OFPP issued its first “Myth-Busting” memorandum in 
2011 on “Addressing Misconceptions to Improve Communication with Industry during the 
Acquisition Process,” with a second iteration in May 2012. Industry leaders saw the effort as 




Invest in the government acquisition workforce. 
As previously discussed, there is a perception that government has come to rely more on LPTA 
because it is a simpler process that requires less expertise to implement and evaluate. Though 
this may be true on some level, only a highly trained workforce can determine if LPTA is 
appropriate in the first place and, if it is appropriate, how to implement it effectively. In order to 
develop the required acquisition workforce to make these complex judgments effectively, the 
DoD must enhance its recruitment processes, improve the hiring process, strive for quality not 
quantity, provide competitive wages, incentivize employees for improved performance, and 
provide continuing training and education.  
Moreover, in instances where LPTA use is criticized, it is sometimes unclear whether the LPTA 
mechanism itself is to blame, or if the problem lies with government’s inability to adequately 
identify and articulate the required minimum requirements. In 2007, for example, a report issued 
by the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations 
(Gansler Commission, 2007) concluded that the Army has failed to recognize the importance of 
the contract requirements development process (i.e., translating a commander’s requirements 
into a statement of need that serves as the basis for a binding contract). According to the report, 
“Despite the critical role that contracting plays in expeditionary operations, no training of 
commanders on this important operational requirement occurs in the Service schools” (p. 40). 
Clearly, in order to maximize the effectiveness of source selection processes, LPTA or 
otherwise, the DoD must invest more in the acquisition workforce. 
Conclusion 
Inappropriate use of lowest price technically acceptable source selection is on the rise, 
particularly in areas of professional services, complex services, and IT. Anecdotally, industry 
leaders believe government agencies are seeing the evidence of quality gaps in product and 
service delivery performance for contracts awarded under LPTA. 
The calls for improved application of LPTA are increasing—from policymakers, government 
leaders, and industry leaders. As mentioned, the HASC criticized the use of LPTA in DoD 
procurements and stated that it should not become the default position. While the DoD promoted 
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the recent Better Buying Power initiatives in order to improve efficiency through affordability, 
some believe language in that initiative inadvertently encourages LPTA usage.  
LPTA is a tool for acquisition and procurement personnel to utilize, but not exclusively. 
Consideration must be given to non-cost factors when appropriate, and awards should not be 
shoehorned into an LPTA source selection as a means of avoiding potential protest or expediting 
the award. Contracts with requirements that contain well-defined risks, with low chance of 
mission failure, are generally an appropriate use of LPTA. When the requirement is more 
complex or risk-based, including applications such as embassy security, technology, or 
intelligence, a trade-off approach likely will be more appropriate.   
The DoD faces ongoing challenges associated with the current budgetary environment. While 
striking the right balance between mitigating requirement risks, efficiently and effectively 
judging offerors, and doing so in a timely manner is a difficult task, it is one that must be upheld 
in order to ensure mission success. LPTA source selection can support the DoD, but only if it is 
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